Apropriação

A nossa leitura de verão que se esticou para o fim do ano e só ontem abrimos o seu último capítulo? Surprise. E a primeira citação em destaque neste?

Ainda acreditas em coincidências? Nigga please. Poucas páginas depois, a tirar teimas:

Com tanta pregação e prática de carnificina entre 1890 e 1914, como é possível que o período seja visto retrospectivamente como uma época ideal que mereceu a denominação de la belle époque? (...) Aqui, basta dizer que as elites intelectuais, e artísticas, e em certa medida a alta sociedade, viviam no seu mundo de criação, crítica e prazer da novidade. Estavam conscientes das crises, sem dúvida, mas depois de terem atravessado duas ou três não havia grande margem para pensar muito no que ainda podiam causar. De qualquer modo, os que se dedicavam à arte e à ciência elevadas não prestavam grande atenção a estes problemas. Era a literatura popular que descrevia o estado das coisas.

Ou é mesmo uma simultaneidade de causas improváveis: os timmings de leitura calharam a sobrepor-se ao pós-Trump, pós-nossas teses sobre os media, punx e bd, elites e populismos.

Misturemos tudo então: sintomas do pré-guerra, a imprensa de hoje e de então, as elites e punx on a mission, e tudo o resto. Desculpas adiantadas pela mescla de tópicos mas descubram a linha orientadora que os atravessa e não se perderão.

I

Desenterramos citação pop alheia para início de hostilidades, mas é-nos cada vez menos merecedor de nota o estrebuchar daqueles que lamuriam por regalias idas.

The denigration of experts (...) is an essential component to this bullshitting culture, because expertise provides a bulwark against nonsense.
in "From Deliciously Ella to Donald Trump" ^{14 jan 2017}

Especialistas. Ie, enquanto gatekeepers. Os especialistas cumprem uma função indispensável à sociedade, apenas não lhes delegamos mandado para decidir por todos, particularmente quando a autoridade que arroga afronta com a generalidade das nossas vivências muito além da sua especialidade, e sobretudo se se socorre de subterfúgios para pressupor essa pretensão de poder. Uma longa distância deverá separar o acto de os consultar e delegar-lhes tarefas na sua especialidade com o render-lhes a autoridade de se intrometerem no demais.

Ainda que lhes seja apenas normal o lamentar da perda de estatuto, pelo contrário não nos é de todo habitual encontrarmo-nos no lado daqueles a quem o momento de momento parece favorecer. Nesse ponto temos que cravar primeira prudência: estamos habituados à companhia dos que foram apanhados no lado errado da História e não nos verão a ser demasiado optimistas com o actual pré-apocalipse que se arrisca. Este, como antes, só nos atrasará: uns cento e qualquer anos atrás um sentimento semelhante espreitava entre os povos com cada vez menos timidez , travado por uma guerra mundial que arrasou com essa tendência. Nunca mais a sociedade encarou o Anarquismo como uma propensão perfeitamente legitima e plausível e quando agora nos rejubilamos com o pêndulo que devolve às massas a desconfiança de toda e qualquer autoridade e o fedor das elites, não confundimos momentos mas apreçamos deveras a similitude de intentos.

Lies and bullshit are both about deception, but while lying is a conscious act of obscuring the truth, bullshitting has no interest at all in the truth

We live in a blog culture where it’s pitched as a triumph of democracy that everyone can claim authority (...) Feelings rather than facts are what matter (...) represents "the full flowering of a therapeutic culture where self-esteem, not achievement, is the ultimate human value, and it’s making us all dumber by the day"
in "From Deliciously Ella to Donald Trump" ^{14 jan 2017}

Abonamos pelos indivíduos que decompõem as massas mas colhem da nossa simpatia em relação à dumbimification dos que compõem as massas. Desde que a diferença te esteja sempre presente, estamos sintonizados.

Nothing proves this more starkly than the way celebrities have filled the vacuum where experts used to be, because who appears to have more self-esteem than a celebrity?
in "From Deliciously Ella to Donald Trump" ^{14 jan 2017}

II

Segway óbvio para a celebridade com mais self-esteem à face da Terra: el Trumpo, cruzado às novas tecnologias porque, como antes, não há emancipação sem evolução nesse departamento, e este apanhado da semana passada dá-te toda a cor que precisas para o ilustrar sem ter que voltar aos Luddites:

At least since the 1960s, the computer—and, beyond that, the Internet–has been a symbol and tool of personal liberation. (…) The computer revolution [is] the real legacy of the sixties - an outgrowth of the counterculture’s scorn for centralized authority.
in "How Silicon Valley Utopianism Brought You the Dystopian Trump Presidency" ^{20 jan 2017}

Hacker Ethic:
1. Access to computers should be unlimited and total.
2. All information should be free.
3. Mistrust authority—promote decentralization.
4. You can create art and beauty on a computer.
5. Computers can change your life for the better.

Só o título senhores: Silicon Valley, utopias e distopias. Mas como sabemos, a apropriação da tecnologia dá para os dois lados e case in point:

But Trump’s inauguration provides a damning counterargument, an example of how each of those ideas can be exploited to advance the very values they were created to oppose. Universal access to computers created a greater audience for Trump’s culture-jamming Twitter feed. An outpouring of free information sowed confusion and created cover for half- and untruths. Trump used anti-authoritarian rhetoric to sow mistrust of the very institutions that might have provided a firewall against his own authoritarian tendencies. Democratizing the tools of creative production created not just ennobling art but a million shitposts and Pepe memes.
in "How Silicon Valley Utopianism Brought You the Dystopian Trump Presidency" ^{20 jan 2017}

E, em coerência com o tema, aflora temas tão recorrentes e caros a quem partilha de certos princípios e valores, sumarizados nesta singela frase:

There was something inherent in humanity that feared true freedom, that preferred to be dominated.

Elaborando sobre dois tipos de liberdade -

Negative freedom, casting off the shackles of social, political, and cultural restrictions; and positive freedom, finding a truer expression of self and identity. When the former occurs without the latter the newly won freedom appears as a curse
in "How Silicon Valley Utopianism Brought You the Dystopian Trump Presidency" ^{20 jan 2017}

A emancipação tech enquanto maldição & Trumpo.

[Trump’s ascendance:] in casting off many of the middlemen, sclerotic corporations, and bureaucracies that throttled human accomplishment, people have achieved negative freedom. But without the tools or power to forge a more meaningful society—a positive freedom—some have plunged back into the comforts of authoritarianism and domination.
in "How Silicon Valley Utopianism Brought You the Dystopian Trump Presidency" ^{20 jan 2017}

Porque vos tentamos convencer a inundar o digital e demonstrar aqui o que demonstras na rua? Porque a tech is up for grabs, e u ain’t grabbin’ it.

It might be time to ask even bigger questions. Questions like:
After people free themselves from their social and cultural shackles, then what?
in "How Silicon Valley Utopianism Brought You the Dystopian Trump Presidency" ^{20 jan 2017}

Entrando em mais detalhe:

Questions like:
Are individuals capable of processing all the information that they once relied on institutions to process for them?

Entrando em muito mais detalhe:

Questions like:
Is technology always an ennobling force?

Não, não o é. Mas pode e deve ser. Só não o está a ser.

The machinery and language of personal liberation have been colonized and subverted by the very forces they were intended to topple. By all accounts, governmental doublespeak, authoritarian intrusion, and state-sponsored surveillance promise to define the coming era (…) The tech industry has achieved negative freedom.

The question now is: What do people do now?
in "How Silicon Valley Utopianism Brought You the Dystopian Trump Presidency" ^{20 jan 2017}

III

Se nos lês com alguma regularidade, o que fazer não te é novidade... A precisar de revisão, segue-se mais um resumo, pop ilustrated, like always mesma pool dos sítios do costume, mesmo intervalo de tempo, e com um longo parêntesis em políticas já que abrimos no tópico do anarquismo.

If you care enough about politics to be an activist, you're probably kind of hard to get along with.

Having grown up in politics, I know firsthand about the enmities that fester between groups that should be allies - groups whose differences can only be parsed after months of study, but who are seemingly more at odds with one another than their obvious political opponents on the "other side" of the debate.

Transaction costs are a huge drag on all human activity, and they're especially high for dissident political movements. A mainstream political movement gets access to all kinds of free coordination tools, from being legally permitted to open a storefront community center to having legislators in office with staffers, to getting favorable coverage in mass media, sending new supporters their way, which gives them more resources to devote to community centers and staffers and PR.

Political oppositions have all kinds of costs that mainstream politics don't have to contend with: at the extreme end, dissidents have to hide their identities from one another lest one person be arrested and the rest of them "rolled up" by the police; what's more, new followers have to be willing to incur the potential risks of blacklisting, arrest, torture and execution. Even for less-imperiled oppositions, there's the risk of social censure for taking public stands outside the mainstream, reflexive dismissal or mockery in mass media, and the frustration of having to "waste" your time on routine tasks that the mainstream gets for free

It's a lot easier to dabble in mainstream politics than it is to get involved in radical politics.

In terms of coordination costs, radical politics are a lot more expensive to get involved with. It's harder to discover the meetings, and just understanding the group's program probably requires quite a lot of mental work because radical politics don't enjoy the advantage of having a school system and press that continuously disseminate their worldview.

In other words, in mainstream politics, supporters can casually date their political lives; in radical politics, you pretty much start off with a marriage proposal.

When you're just dating, it doesn't matter if you don't find yourself out for an evening with someone you couldn't spend the rest of your life with. It may be enough that they are a good dancer or a fun conversationalist. But if you skip straight to marriage, then any irreconcilable difference is a deal-breaker. The reason two Marxists can't abide each other despite having differences so esoteric that they can only be appreciated after a month's careful reading is that they know that these differences can't be reconciled, and that, in a world of scarce followers who have to overcome significant barriers to join them, anyone who signs up for one flavor is virtually certain to never back the other. When the stakes are higher, the differences matter more.
in "The Women's March and the Judean People's Front: After Occupy, after trumpism, a new networked politics" ^{22 jan 2017}

Se o longo parêntesis te distraiu, voltemos –

lower organization costs upended the political landscape

Which brings me to networked politics.

Networks solve coordination costs. The cost of discovering a radical group has never been lower: combine search engines with anonymity tools with social media, and you have a way for people with extremely high-risk beliefs to discover one another, refine their views, attract more followers, and work together for their common aims.

Lowering coordination costs confers a isproportionate benefit to radical and fringe groups, and has a much less significant effect on mainstream activities.

When you make coordination costs lower, the people whose work is most constrained by coordination costs get the biggest benefit. Thus the era of networked politics has seen profound shift and significant achievements for political fringes.
in "The Women's March and the Judean People's Front: After Occupy, after trumpism, a new networked politics" ^{22 jan 2017}

E de volta ao exemplo Trump, gods gift to all things media:

Trump is the first US leader to use the netroots to both tear down his opponent and then take power in the resulting vacuum. He is going to try to govern with his netroots, not just ride them to power.

But netroots movements have always been better at tearing down than building up.
in "The Women's March and the Judean People's Front: After Occupy, after trumpism, a new networked politics" ^{22 jan 2017}

E essa é a nossa deixa. São os punx capazes de um movimento de resistência explicitamente devotado ao destruir de grilhetas e corroer de autoridade? Estamos algo optimistas com as ferramentas que nos dão desta volta.

IV

E não somos os únicos: entre aqueles que fazem da comunicação e informação modo de vida a tendência já foi notada. Mesmas semanas, sítios de sempre, a propósito da radicalização de nichos, um estudo que inclui na análise exemplos como a Greenpeace ou o ProPublica, mas nos chamou a atenção com este excerto:

The problem with the current model for investigative reporting is that it depends on mainstream media for distribution. What that really means is that we’re putting ourselves on a burning platform.

The rise of Breitbart can teach journalists a lot about how to build audiences, affect political change, and build news businesses.
in "'Stakeholder-driven journalism' is the real future of watchdog reporting, a new book argues" ^{27 jan 2017}

Definições prévias:

Stakeholder-driven media: media created and controlled by communities of practice and interest
Stakeholders: people who affect or are affected by issues and organizations.
in "'Stakeholder-driven journalism' is the real future of watchdog reporting, a new book argues" ^{27 jan 2017}

- e conclusão a registar:

For sites like Breitbart, the question isn’t ‘Which stories matter?’ but ‘What are you going to do about it?' They’re talking to people who have real skin in the game and who need information that can help to guide their actions and decisions.

Unlike the typical mainstream media organization, which positions itself as an impartial messenger of the news that it thinks matters to readers, stakeholder-based organizations are heavily invested in the goal of empowering readers to affect the topics they care about. The fundamental difference (...) is that stakeholder-based groups unabashedly see themselves as partisan members of or advocates for the groups that they represent.
in "'Stakeholder-driven journalism' is the real future of watchdog reporting, a new book argues" ^{27 jan 2017}

That’s us, punx!
Com bónus, se nos acompanhas nas teses, este extra é-te familiar e devolve-te ao início do post de hoje:

It’s in many ways a return to the pre-1920’s era of media, for better or for worse.

E acresce o disclaimer de sempre: $$$, they ain’t punx.

The goal, too, is to help more journalists think of their work in business terms. One of the book’s chapters breaks down the business model of investigative journalism into core components such as "value proposition," "customer segments," and "cost structure." The idea, Hunter said, is to help investigative news organizations think more creatively about their businesses and wean themselves off foundation money, which many assume is the only way to pay for watchdog reporting.
in "'Stakeholder-driven journalism' is the real future of watchdog reporting, a new book argues" ^{27 jan 2017}

V

Desenvolvendo sobre essa tendência, mesma semana, mesmos sítios de sempre:

Historically, journalists were divided into two groups: the Disseminators, who favor detachment and objectivity, and the Interpretives, who favor involvement and advocacy. By the early 2000s, two new roles emerged: the Adversarials, who show a more combative outlook toward government and business, and the Populist Mobilizers, who reflect a movement toward civic journalism that emphasizes giving ordinary citizens a voice.
in "Disseminator, Populist Mobilizer, or Contextualist: What type of journalist are you?" ^{24 jan 2017}

Enter web e punx on a mission:

The emergence of a new journalistic ideology: the Contextualist. Contextual news stories provide a deeper understanding of the news, thereby providing a big-picture approach. (…) Three recently termed genres with growing momentum: constructive journalism, solutions journalism, and restorative narrative.

Constructive journalism intends to engage and empower audiences and ultimately improve society.

Solutions stories are rigorous and fact-driven news stories that provide credible solutions to societal problems.

Restorative narratives focus on recovery, restoration, and resilience in the aftermath, or in the midst of, difficult times.

Initial research shows that journalism that offers a solution, rather than just focusing on the problem, provokes greater interest in audiences and leaves audiences feeling positive and encouraged.
in "Disseminator, Populist Mobilizer, or Contextualist: What type of journalist are you?" ^{24 jan 2017}

Punx e autenticidade.

These new genres of contextual reporting could also help to restore trust in the news media. Stories don’t end after the news breaks. Contextual reporting gives audiences a more complete story, often focusing on how communities respond and adapt.

This time of great challenge to the news media has left many journalists considering how to restore trust with readers. If more journalists are introduced to these styles as actual genres of reporting, which can augment breaking news, the industry could move toward a more interpretive, socially conscious journalism.
in "Disseminator, Populist Mobilizer, or Contextualist: What type of journalist are you?" ^{24 jan 2017}

Substitui "industry" por "cena" e chegaste.

VI

Coup d'état, fechamos com o A-to-the-G de sexta passada em "É a política? Não, a cultura":

Ao contrário do coro vindo do lado esquerdo do campo político, não acho que o problema da comunicação social seja o do monolitismo de direita da indústria da consciência e da informação. O problema é muito mais cultural do que político. (…) Se descontarmos uns restos que nos vão entretendo, o pensamento, a literatura, a arte e a cultura em geral desertaram do espaço público. E a dimensão cultural do jornalismo foi completamente abandonada.
in "É a política? Não, a cultura" ^{27 jan 2017}

OS POSITIVOS: do contra, por um certo tipo de cultura.

Grande parte do coro que se ergue hoje contra os media e o jornalismo herdou a cultura da esquerda dos anos 70, que reduziu o poder dos meios de comunicação de massa a um único conceito: o de manipulação. Trata-se da ideia de que os media dissimulam a sua motivação mais profunda, escondem os seus cálculos estratégicos e mascaram as suas verdadeiras intenções. (…) Mas os que se presumem especialistas em desmistificação jornalística, com a missão de conduzir à verdade e à razão os leitores leigos e ignorantes, têm uma pretensão ridícula e uma consciência obsoleta dos media. Hoje, um jornal que julga que está a enganar os seus leitores está a enganar-se a si próprio de maneira patética. Jornais que têm um projecto político e ideológico não querem nem conseguiriam dissimulá-lo. É por ter fetichizado o conceito de manipulação, persistindo nele como categoria interpretativa, que a esquerda é incapaz de lidar com a paisagem mediática e, demonizando o adversário pelo lado errado, só reforça o seu poder.
in "É a política? Não, a cultura" ^{27 jan 2017}

OS POSITIVOS: porque não fetichizamos os jornais e a trabalhar para a extinção destes.

E devolvemos ao início do post: scroll up.

questões que se pertinam